Despite this complicated history, 123 agreements can still serve as a mechanism for the responsible development of nuclear energy. For example, the 2008 US-India nuclear deal led India to divide its civil and military nuclear sectors, placing the former under IAEA safeguards. And in 2009, the United States signed a so-called Gold Standard 123 agreement with the United Arab Emirates, which guaranteed that the United Arab Emirates would never attempt to enrich or reprocess nuclear materials or technologies. The Trump administration submitted 123 new agreements with Mexico and the United Kingdom to Congress in May 2018. The United Kingdom had previously fallen under Agreement 123 between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), but after the United Kingdom`s withdrawal from the European Union, the bilateral US-EU agreement will enter into force. Japan`s agreement technically expired in 2018, but renewal conditions require the agreement to remain in force until it is terminated by a party. As of March 28, 2019, the United States had 23 such agreements governing peaceful nuclear cooperation with 48 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and government agencies in Taiwan (through the American Institute in Taiwan), as described below. The Trump administration is currently negotiating a Deal 123 with Saudi Arabia. The next agreement, which expires without renewal conditions (which could trigger a simpler automatic renewal without the agreement having to be renegotiated or resubmitted to Congress), will be concluded with Egypt in December 2021. In addition to the specific nuclear safety measures required by law, Article 123 requires that nine non-proliferation conditions be met before an agreement can be signed.

In particular, the cooperating Party must agree to place all nuclear material and equipment transmitted under certain safeguards, including IAEA safeguards where the country is a non-nuclear-weapon State. The host State must guarantee the physical security of all nuclear material, it must guarantee that it will refrain from testing nuclear explosives or for other military purposes, it must guarantee that no nuclear material from the United States will be enriched or reprocessed, and it must guarantee that it will not disclose the material to unauthorized persons or outside its jurisdiction without consent. In addition, the United States reserves the right to demand the return of any nuclear technology from a non-nuclear-weapon State in the event of unauthorized military nuclear work or the lifting of IAEA safeguards. The host country must ensure that no plutonium, uranium-233 and uranium-235 enriched to more than 20 per cent will be stored in a facility that has not been pre-approved by the United States. Finally, the host country must ensure that any nuclear material or nuclear facility it produces or constructs under the Agreement is subject to all of the above requirements. These requirements are not absolute and, as we have already mentioned, can be exempted by the President. In particular, a president may exempt any of the requirements if he determines that it “would be seriously detrimental to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize common defense and security.” While no president has taken advantage of this flexibility in any of the agreements currently in place, in 2006 President George W.

Bush was able to circumvent the need to submit an exempt agreement to Congress because Justice Henry. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 explicitly allowed it to waive some of the requirements of Section 123 without obtaining congressional approval, as is normally required. “To be a good citizen of the world, to show that we will be responsible and that we will be a world leader, signing an Agreement 123 with the appropriate additional protocols is a wealth of common sense for me,” U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry said in an interview with CNBC on Oct. 26. On the same day, at a panel discussion in Abu Dhabi, he predicted that “the kingdom and the rulers of the kingdom … will find a way to sign an agreement 123 with the United States, I think. A 123-year agreement alone does not allow countries to enrich or reprocess nuclear material acquired by the United States, and authorization to do so requires another negotiated agreement. Currently, a debate is underway in the non-proliferation community over the “gold standard,” dubbed after the 2009 agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)123, according to which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has voluntarily renounced the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing (RES) technologies and capabilities. .